Scaling up the analysis of sensitive or confidential documents frequently stumbles on the limited number of individuals with the necessary clearance to access the documents. The availability of cryptographic protocols compatible with text processing methods can greatly improve this situation allowing for the automated processing of large corpora of confidential documents by "untrusted" third-parties. In this paper we propose a protocol which allows for secure outsourcing of text analytics tasks without compromising the confidentiality of documents. The method scales to large corpora, and presents linear time complexity on the size of the corpus.
Introduction
A fertile ground for the application of machine-learning based on natural language features is in triaging classified or otherwise sensitive documents for declassification. [6] The classical scenario of examining sensitive documents for declassification purposes involves the manual reading and evaluation by a human of the required security clearance and of the specific knowledge to understand the document and its implications. The problem with this classic scenario is that such individuals are usually few and command high wages. The viable rate of manual analysis of documents is much slower than what is necessary to tackle the enormous volumes of documents scheduled for evaluation. This problem is a perfect target for machine learning classification algorithms which can work at very high speeds without exposing the documents to non-authorized humans. So why is this not yet the standard procedure for such applications? Mainly because these algorithms must be trained under the supervision of a human specialist before they can be used.
In the most usual scenarios, document encryption renders documents useless for text processing tasks such as the classification of documents.
In most text processing tasks, the ability to identify occurrences of words and their absolute and relative positions (co-occurrences) is essential. However, when whole documents are encrypted, the discrimination of its constituent parts (sentences, words, tables, figures, etc.) is completely impossible unless the documet is decrypted first. A natural solution to this issue would be to hash each word separately and in sequence.
In fact, this is already commonplace, in text processing software, which attribute numerical IDs to words, in order to save space, and speed up computation. But instead of attributing simple sequential IDs to words, which can be cumbersome with growing dictionaries, in standard text processing tasks this is accomplished by the compilation of a corpus dictionary with the subsequent attribution of a unique integer ID to each separate word, in order to avoid having to look up a potentially very large table every time we need to find the ID of a word. It has become common practice to use non-cryptographic hash functions (such as CRC32, MD5, etc) to derive integer IDs for individual words with negligible probabilities of key collision, i.e. two different words with the same ID [8] . This is not done for security reasons though, and non-cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 or CRC32 are vulnerable to collisions, or even brute-force attacks [2, 3] .
What we propose in this paper is akin to homomorphic encryption in its general purpose of allowing for analytical manipulations of encrypted data, but is much less restrictive [4] . Our only requirement is that the statistical properties of the corpus as a list of words remain the same after hashing.
In this paper, we propose a protocol in which a client in possession of a classified corpus of documents can hire an analyst to analyze the corpus without revealing the contents of the documents. We also offer an open source software tool to efficiently hash corpora of sensitive documents, before they can be sent out for analysis.
Methodology
The Methodology proposed takes advantage of the fact that most text processing models are language agnostic, relying only on statistical properties of the documents. By hashing individual words instead of whole documents we can hash the content without affecting the statistical properties of the documents as collections of words.
Hash functions and cryptographic hash functions
Hash functions are mathematical functions which map data coming from a set of values of arbitrary size to a set of values of fixed size. Hash functions are deterministic functions so the same data will always lead to the same hash value. They should also be easy to compute in order to be of practical use on large datasets.
Cryptographic hash functions are special hash functions which beside being deterministic and easy to compute, are also required to be virtually noninvertible, meaning that it should be infeasible to obtain the original data from its hash value. Hash values should also be uncorrelated to the original data, meaning that similar data do not lead to similar hashes. Finally, they must also be resistant to collisions, that is, it must be very hard to find different data leading to the same hash value.
On Table 1 , we can see the hash values of two similar words. Notice that their hash values are vastly different even though they differ by a single letter. The Hashing Workflow
Our protocol starts from a previously tokenized set of documents. Tokenization (splitting the documents into words or tokens) is often a required first step before more detailed statistical analysis of texts can take place. Tokenization is also a step that can benefit from language as well as domain knowledge. Thus tokenization should be done by the client before the hashing step.
Once the corpus documents have been converted into sequences of tokens, it can be passed on to the hashing protocol described below. We assume here that the corpus is a list of documents, each of which is a list of tokens (words). Documents may be thought of full documents or parts of it (paragraphs, sentences).
1. Create an empty corpus structure (list of lists) to hold the hashed tokens; 2. Create a decoding dictionary: a list of key, value pairs where the key is an encoded token (hash) and the values are the unhashed token and its salt.
3. Create an encoding dictionary: a list of key, value pairs where the key is a plain token and the value is its cryptographic hash.
Iterate over unhashed tokens
(a) Check if the word is in the encoding dictionary; (b) If so, add its hash value to the hashed tokens list (c) If not, hash it with the addition of a random 1 salt, and add them to the encoding and decoding dictionaries.
Return the hashed corpus and the dictionary
After the hashing, the client retains the dictionaries and hands over the hashed corpus to the analyst. The analyst can then proceed to analyze the corpus as if it were any ordinary tokenized corpus. After the analysis is done the client can use the decoding dictionary to decode the results, reverting the hashed tokens to their original unhashed values, and interpret the analysis.
Security Assessment
Even though the mere use of the protocol presented here is an important step in terms of security in an analytic scenario, it is worth looking at the most evident attack vectors the protocol is vulnerable to. 
Attacks to the Hash Function
Vulnerability to this kind of attack is related to weaknesses of the cryptographic hash function used. Therefore this risk can always be diminished by choosing a stronger hash function.
Usually the security of a hash function is measured in terms of three properties: Pre-image resistance, meaning that given a hash h, it should be very difficult to find any word w such that hash(w) = h; Second pre-image resistance, meaning that given a word w 1 , it should be difficult to find a word w 2 such that hash(w 1 ) = hash(w 2 ); and collision resistance which means it is difficult to find two different words w 1 and w 2 such that hash(w 1 ) = hash(w 2 ).
Using a SHA256 hashing function, which can generate N = 2 256 different hash values, the probability of not having a collision after hashing k words without is:
N which can be approximated by:
If we hash all unique words in the English language, roughly 400, 000 the probability of having a collision is:
An actual experiment on the English language Wikipedia points to approximately a hundred thousand distinct tokens in 3.9 million documents, leading to an even smaller probability of collision than the one calculated above.
A more common attack is the dictionary attack, where the attacker builds a dictionary of hashed words, and tries to match the hashed tokens in a document to this dictionarized vocabulary.
In order for the attack to be possible the attacker must know which hash function has been used in the hashing, which is not a public information. Only the client knows which hash function has been used, because she can choose the one she wants. Besides, since our protocol adds a random salt string to each token before hashing, a standard dictionary attack is rendered completely harmless. Salting a password may not help to protect it, because any word+salt that hashes to the same value works. In our scenario, the attacker's goal is to find the correct word behind a hash, so "simply" finding a collision is not enough, because due to the pidgeon hole principle (or Dirichlet box principle) [7] , there maybe more than one word that hashes to the same value. What is needed is a pre-image attack which is considered much harder than collision attacks.
Moreover, if an attacker searches actively for collisions, she is more likely to find wrong combinations of token+salt than the original correct token+salt, if salt length is sufficiently big. If we assume a hash function whose output is 32 bytes (e.g., SHA256), salt byte length of same size, and a vocabulary of n words, we have n · 2 256 possible combinations of token+salt. If this hash function is approximately uniform (a property cryptographic hash functions should have), we expect n collisions per possible output value, because for every word there are 2 256 possible salts and the same number of hash values. Therefore, for the correct hash, there are on average n collisions, but only one of them is the correct one, the one formed by the original token.
Code complexity and application examples
In this section we have employed the reference implementation in Python which we are open sourcing under the lesser general public license (LGPL). The source code is freely available under https://github.com/NAMD/corpushash. For the natural language processing (NLP) applications shown we have used the gensim Python library [5] . In these applications, our goal was to demonstrate that the results of the analysis run on the plain text corpus and the hashed one were identical after decoding.
Complexity
We ran benchmark tests to assess the library's performance, which are all available at the code repository. There are two main variables that determine the library's performance: corpus size in tokens, and corpus nesting level (flat list versus nested list structure). The main results are that the library has linear complexity in the former (see fig. 2 ), while incrementing corpus nesting level by 1 will make the hashing take 10% longer.
For a real-world measure of the performance, we have hashed the entire corpus of the Portuguese language Wikipedia 2 (1.3 GB compressed, almost 1 million articles) in 00:10:10 of CPU time, but 00:45:59s of Wall time, in a machine with an Intel core i5-4590 (3.7GHz). Disk I/O was the bottleneck here, as the corpus documents are streamed from disk to be hashed and back to disk aftewards in order guarantee constant memory usage. Using a Solid-State Disk (SSD) or parallelizing the I/O can improve these times. Table 2 : TF-IDF weights for a few hashed tokens. The hashes were further encoded in Base85 format to reduce to space required to store the hashed corpus. The TF-IDF scores for both corpora were identical as expected. 
TF-IDF Model
In this application we calculate TF-IDF weights of an English language corpus made available by the NLTK [1] library based on works offered by Project Gutenberg. Table 3 : LSI results for the top topic (top ten words). Again the word composition and coefficients for every word were identical for both corpora.
LSI Model
Another common text analytics methodology is the topic modeling using the latent semantic indexing algorithm (LSI). In this application we employed the Twitter Samples corpus made available by the NLTK [1] and Twitter. We followed the standard steps and our validation procedure was similar to the one done for the TF-IDF analysis. We calculate the topics for the plain and the hashed corpus and among the 100 selected as a parameter, we compare the top topics, their component words and their coefficients. We were able to demonstrate in this this way that the two result sets where the same. Table 3 contain the ten top words in the first topic and their coefficients for both the plain and hashed models.
Discussion
The security of the protocol proposed here relies on two basic attack vectors: (1) Breaking the hash function, and (2) Attempting to reconstruct the documents based the frequency of co-occurrences of words. It is not our goal in this paper to provide guarantees about the level of security of the proposed protocol, but rather to propose a reasonably secure and computationally cheap protocol to help alleviating the present bottlenecks in the analysis of sensitive documents. We have shown that our protocol scales up linearly with the number of words in the corpus, imposing a negligible additional computational cost to the whole intended textual analysis.
The current protocol can also serve other purposes. For example, the hashed corpora can be fed to an information retrieval system providing full text indexing and search. Thus the owner of collection of sensitive documents could publish a search interface to the collection in which users could perform searches normally. Once the search terms would be hashed (using the encoding dictionary), and used to query the index. The resulting documents could then be queued for manual assessment to determine if they can be released. This procedure could lead to the opening of huge collections for public search, without requiring first that all documents are individually examined and released. The effort of manual analysis could in effect be prioritized based on the subjects of greater public interest.
Our methodology has some limitations, however. Since the words are no longer identifiable to the contractor, all the pre-processing of the corpus such as tokenization, lemmatization or stemming, removal of stopwords, etc. has to be done by a trained technician with security clearance. Analyses which require part-of-speech (POS) tagging, i.e. based on syntactic features, can only be done if the POS tags are calculated beforehand and hashed as well, following the same protocol. The provision of POS information, even if in hashed form, is likely to facilitate frequency based attacks.
